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29 changes: 29 additions & 0 deletions gems/rack/CVE-2026-22860.yml
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---
gem: rack
cve: 2026-22860
ghsa: mxw3-3hh2-x2mh
url: https://github.com/rack/rack/security/advisories/GHSA-mxw3-3hh2-x2mh
title: Rack has a Directory Traversal via Rack:Directory
date: 2026-02-17
description: "## Summary\n\n`Rack::Directory`’s path check used a string prefix match
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description: should be block text, not a quoted string. It appears that code blocks can confuse YAML's formatting.

on the expanded path. A request like `/../root_example/` can escape the configured
root if the target path starts with the root string, allowing directory listing
outside the intended root.\n\n## Details\n\nIn `directory.rb`, `File.expand_path(File.join(root,
path_info)).start_with?(root)` does not enforce a path boundary. If the server root
is `/var/www/root`, a path like `/var/www/root_backup` passes the check because
it shares the same prefix, so `Rack::Directory` will list that directory also. \n\n##
Impact\n\nInformation disclosure via directory listing outside the configured root
when `Rack::Directory` is exposed to untrusted clients and a directory shares the
root prefix (e.g., `public2`, `www_backup`).\n\n## Mitigation\n\n* Update to a patched
version of Rack that correctly checks the root prefix.\n* Don't name directories
with the same prefix as one which is exposed via `Rack::Directory`."
cvss_v3: 7.5
patched_versions:
- "~> 2.2.22"
- "~> 3.1.20"
- ">= 3.2.5"
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YAML Array elements should be indented by two spaces.

related:
url:
- https://github.com/rack/rack/security/advisories/GHSA-mxw3-3hh2-x2mh
- https://github.com/rack/rack/commit/75c5745c286637a8f049a33790c71237762069e7
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mxw3-3hh2-x2mh
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YAML Array elements should be indented by two spaces.

53 changes: 53 additions & 0 deletions gems/rack/CVE-2026-25500.yml
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---
gem: rack
cve: 2026-25500
ghsa: whrj-4476-wvmp
url: https://github.com/rack/rack/security/advisories/GHSA-whrj-4476-wvmp
title: 'Stored XSS in Rack::Directory via javascript: filenames rendered into anchor
href'
date: 2026-02-17
description: |-
## Summary

`Rack::Directory` generates an HTML directory index where each file entry is rendered as a clickable link. If a file exists on disk whose basename begins with the `javascript:` scheme (e.g. `javascript:alert(1)`), the generated index includes an anchor whose `href` attribute is exactly `javascript:alert(1)`. Clicking this entry executes arbitrary JavaScript in the context of the hosting application.

This results in a client-side XSS condition in directory listings generated by `Rack::Directory`.

## Details

`Rack::Directory` renders directory entries using an HTML row template similar to:

```html
<a href='%s'>%s</a>
```

The `%s` placeholder is populated directly with the file’s basename. If the basename begins with `javascript:`, the resulting HTML contains an executable JavaScript URL:

```html
<a href='javascript:alert(1)'>javascript:alert(1)</a>
```

Because the value is inserted directly into the `href` attribute without scheme validation or normalization, browsers interpret it as a JavaScript URI. When a user clicks the link, the JavaScript executes in the origin of the Rack application.

## Impact

If `Rack::Directory` is used to expose filesystem contents over HTTP, an attacker who can create or upload files within that directory may introduce a malicious filename beginning with `javascript:`.

When a user visits the directory listing and clicks the entry, arbitrary JavaScript executes in the application's origin. Exploitation requires user interaction (clicking the malicious entry).

## Mitigation

* Update to a patched version of Rack in which `Rack::Directory` prefixes generated anchors with a relative path indicator (e.g. `./filename`).
* Avoid exposing user-controlled directories via `Rack::Directory`.
* Apply a strict Content Security Policy (CSP) to reduce impact of potential client-side execution issues.
* Where feasible, restrict or sanitize uploaded filenames to disallow dangerous URI scheme prefixes.
cvss_v3: 5.4
patched_versions:
- "~> 2.2.22"
- "~> 3.1.20"
- ">= 3.2.5"
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YAML Array elements should be indented by two spaces.

related:
url:
- https://github.com/rack/rack/security/advisories/GHSA-whrj-4476-wvmp
- https://github.com/rack/rack/commit/f2f225f297b99fbee3d9f51255d41f601fc40aff
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-whrj-4476-wvmp
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YAML Array elements should be indented by two spaces.