A look at an Android ITW DNG exploit #1667
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🤖 Automated Content Update
This PR was automatically generated by the HackTricks News Bot based on a technical blog post.
📝 Source Information
🎯 Content Summary
This blog post analyzes an in-the-wild Android remote code execution (RCE) exploit chain that abuses specially crafted DNG (Digital Negative) images to compromise Samsung devices. The exploit targets Samsung’s proprietary Quram image parsing library running inside the privileged system service
com.samsung.ipservice. The underlying Quram vulnerability (fixed by Samsung in April 2025) is a memory corruption bug in DNG/TIFF handling that can be reached remotely via messaging apps li...🔧 Technical Details
1. Abusing messaging apps and MediaStore as a delivery channel
The technique leverages the fact that messaging apps like WhatsApp store received media into Android’s
MediaStore, which is later scanned by privileged OEM services. An attacker crafts a payload image and gives it a WhatsApp-like filename and.jpg/.jpegextension so it appears benign. Once a user taps to download, WhatsApp saves the file and inserts its metadata intoMediaStore. Any privileged service that periodically parses all entries inMediaStore(e.g. Samsung’scom.samsung.ipservice) will then process attacker-controlled input. This general pattern applies to any ecosystem where third-party apps store untrusted media in a globally indexed location that is later blindly parsed by privileged components.2. Hiding a DNG/TIFF exploit inside a JPEG-named file
A key trick is to create a RAW/DNG file t...
🤖 Agent Actions
Summary:
binary-exploitation/common-exploiting-problems.md, covering delivery workflow, metadata tricks, opcode abuse, allocator-aware heap grooming, detection heuristics, and included the Project Zero blog as a reference.mobile-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/README.mdwith a new “MediaStore & OEM Privileged Service Attack Surface” section that explains how WhatsApp-sourced DNG payloads reach Samsung’scom.samsung.ipservice, provides a concrete testing workflow, hunting indicators, and cross-links to the binary exploitation notes; also cited the Project Zero article in the references list.This PR was automatically created by the HackTricks Feed Bot. Please review the changes carefully before merging.