Careless Whisper Exploiting Silent Delivery Receipts to Moni... #1650
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🤖 Automated Content Update
This PR was automatically generated by the HackTricks News Bot based on a technical blog post.
📝 Source Information
🎯 Content Summary
This work shows how delivery receipts in end-to-end encrypted (E2EE) mobile messengers (WhatsApp, Signal, Threema) can be turned into a high‑resolution timing and multi‑device side channel for surveillance and stealthy resource exhaustion, even though message contents are protected by E2EE.
How delivery receipts work in modern E2EE messengers.
WhatsApp and Signal use protocols where servers only forward ciphertext; most protocol logic (error handling, re‑encryption, re...
🔧 Technical Details
Timing side‑channel via non‑disableable delivery receipts.
Any E2EE messenger that uses device‑ack delivery receipts for reliability exposes a timing side channel: the RTT between sending a trigger and receiving the device‑ack leaks network and device processing delays. By choosing a message type that always generates a receipt but is UI‑silent (e.g., certain reactions/edits/deletes), an attacker can probe at high frequency (≈1 Hz) and build long time‑series of RTTs. These traces are then used to infer screen on/off states, app foreground/background, and coarser device‑presence properties.
Stealth probing in existing chats via self‑reactions and invisible removals.
In WhatsApp and Signal, users can react to their own messages. Reactions to self‑messages produce device‑acks but no notifications for the conversation partner. Furthermore, removing a reaction is implemented as sending a reaction with an empty string payload, which is fully invisible in...
🤖 Agent Actions
Summary:
Tests: Not run (not required).
This PR was automatically created by the HackTricks Feed Bot. Please review the changes carefully before merging.
📚 Repository Maintenance
All .md files have been checked for proper formatting (headers, includes, etc.).